Paternalism and Psychology by Glaeser, Edward L.
Paternalism and Psychology
Edward L. Glaesert
Does bounded rationality make paternalism more attractive? This Essay argues that errors
will be larger when suppliers have stronger incentives or lower costs of persuasion and when con-
sumers have weaker incentives to learn the truth. These comparative statics suggest that bounded
rationality will often increase the costs of government decisionmaking relative to private decision-
making, because consumers have better incentives to overcome errors than government decision-
makers, consumers have stronger incentives to choose well when they are purchasing than when
they are voting, and it is more costly to change the beliefs of millions of consumers than a handful
of bureaucrats. As such, recognizing the limits of human cognition may strengthen the case for
limited government.
INTRODUCTION
An increasingly large body of evidence documenting bounded ra-
tionality and nonstandard preferences has led many scholars to ques-
tion economics' traditional hostility towards paternalism.' After all, if
individuals have so many cognitive difficulties, then it is surely possi-
ble that government intervention can improve welfare. As Christine
Jolls, Cass Sunstein, and Richard Thaler write: "[B]ounded rationality
pushes toward a sort of anti-antipaternalism-a skepticism about an-
tipaternalism, but not an affirmative defense of paternalism."2 Even if
these authors stop short of endorsing traditional hard paternalism,
such as sin taxes and prohibitions, Sunstein and Thaler are enthusiastic
about soft or libertarian paternalism, where the government engages
in "debiasing," changing default rules, and other policies that will
change behavior without limiting choice.'
In this Essay, I argue that the flaws in human cognition should
make us more, not less, wary about trusting government decisionmak-
" Fred and Eleanor Glimp Professor of Economics, Harvard University, and Director of
the Taubman Center for State and Local Government and the Rappaport Institute for Greater
Boston. Daniel Benjamin, Jeffrey Miron, Cass Sunstein, and Cornelius A. C. Vermeule III pro-
vided extremely helpful comments.
1 Following the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's definition, I take paternalism to
mean "the interference of a state or an individual with another person, against their will, and
justified by a claim that the person interfered with will be better off or protected from harm."
Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in Edward N. Zalta, ed, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(2006), online at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paternalism/ (visited Jan 3,2006).
2 Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law
and Economics, 50 Stan L Rev 1471, 1541 (1998) (explaining how bounded rationality calls into
question traditional favoring of antipaternalism).
3 Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 Am Econ Rev 175,
175 (2003) (advocating certain noncoercive paternalistic policies).
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ing. The debate over paternalism must weigh private and public errors.
If errors are thought to be exogenous then there is little reason to be-
lieve that these errors will be greater among public or private deci-
sionmakers, but if psychological errors are understood to be endoge-
nous, then there are good reasons why we might think that public de-
cisionmaking is likely to be more flawed than private decisionmaking.
In Part I, I review the evidence supporting the view that psychological
errors are endogenous market phenomena that respond to both "de-
mand" and "supply." On the supply side, purveyors of influence have
the capacity to change popular opinion. On the demand side, human
beings have some capacity to limit errors, especially with the time and
incentives to acquire advice and information.
In Part II, I present three simple models that show how endoge-
nous cognitive errors increase the advantage of private decisionmak-
ing over public decisionmaking, which suggests that recognizing the
limits of human cognition pushes us away, not towards, paternalism. In
these models, as the bounds to human rationality increase, the quality
of government decisionmaking decreases even faster than the quality
of private decisionmaking.
The first model hinges on the fact that consumers face stronger
incentives to get things right than government decisionmakers do
when making decisions about private individuals. In the second model,
the supply of error comes from a private firm that is trying to increase
demand. If the cost of persuading one government bureaucrat is less
than the cost of persuading millions of consumers, then government
bureaucrats will be more prone to error than private consumers.
The final model looks at the electoral process and relies on the
fact that individuals have stronger incentives when making consump-
tion decisions than when taking part in an election to choose a leader
who will make consumption decisions for them. In this model, there is
an advantage from public decisionmaking. When information is not
highly correlated, and a majority is better informed than a minority,
then the tyranny of the majority can have benefits (these would dis-
appear with enough consumer heterogeneity). However, as people
become more and more prone to error, the tyranny of the majority
induces everyone to make the wrong decision.
These examples are far from definitive. In some cases the gov-
ernments may make better decisions. Still, once errors are seen to be
endogenous, the lack of incentives in politics and among politicians
and the small numbers of public decisionmakers suggest that govern-
ment decisionmaking is likely to be particularly erroneous. Although
there are surely some empirical cases of paternalism that have been
successful, across a wide range of settings, the models' basic implica-
tion of faulty government decisionmaking cannot be rejected. Over and
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over again, paternalism has been abused by governments responding
to special interests or seeking to aggrandize their own authority.In Part III, I turn to soft paternalism. Although I generally share
Sunstein and Thaler's view that soft paternalism is less damaging than
hard paternalism and that in many cases some form of paternalism is
inevitable, I respectfully disagree with their view that this type of pa-
ternalism "should be acceptable to even the most ardent libertarian."'
Soft paternalism is neither innocuous nor obviously benign.
If abused by a less than perfect government, soft paternalism can
make decisions worse, just like hard paternalism. As George Loewen-
stein and Ted O'Donoghue argue, soft paternalism towards an activity
essentially creates a psychic tax on that activity that provides no reve-
nues, which can be much worse than hard paternalism. ' Hard paternal-
ism in the form of tax rates or bans is easy to monitor and control; soft
paternalism is not. Soft paternalism often relies on stigmatizing behav-
ior like smoking, drinking or homosexuality, and this can and has led
to dislike or hatred of those individuals who continue to engage in the
disapproved activities. Moreover, soft paternalism will surely increase
support for hard paternalism, as it seems to have done in the case of
cigarettes.
Finally, persuasion lies at the heart of much of soft paternalism,
and it is not obvious that we want governments to become more adept
at persuading voters or for governments to invest in infrastructure
that will support persuasion. Governments have a strong incentive to
abuse any persuasion-related infrastructure and use it for their own
interests, mostly keeping themselves in power.
In the conclusion of this Essay, I consider some simple rules for
guiding the implementation of paternalism and for limiting govern-
mental errors related to cognitive limitations. If experience reduces
errors, then there is a case for policy conservatism. The possibility for
wild errors in democratic elections suggests the value of institutions
that provide for "cooling off." The ability of entrepreneurs to persuade
suggests an examination of political (and governmental) advertising.
Finally, because cognition has more problems with complex decisions,
there is a case for more single-issue debates or even elections.
I. THE ENDOGENEITY OF ERROR
The new case for paternalism is based on two different psycho-
logical phenomena: bounded rationality and self-control problems.
4 Id.
5 George Loewenstein and Ted O'Donoghue, "We Can Do This the Easy Way or the Hard
Way": Negative Emotions, Self-Regulation, and the Law, 73 U Chi L Rev 183,190 (2006).
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The literature on self-control and hyperbolic discounting argues that
6people would want to refrain from certain actions if they only could.
The bounded rationality literature argues that people face severe cog-
nitive limitations and often make bad decisions.
This Essay focuses on paternalism and bounded rationality, be-
cause bounded rationality is quite common and provides a clearer case
for real paternalism than self-control problems do.8 Limits to knowl-
edge and reasoning are quite common. Thaler describes a striking num-
ber of examples, like the Winner's Curse, that illustrate the human ten-
dency towards biases and errors.9 Opinion polls suggest striking exam-
ples of erroneous beliefs. For example, according to the World Values
Survey, 71 percent of Americans believe in "the Devil," while most
French people do not; only 19 percent of the French believe "that there
is some sort of Mephistopheles."1 One of these groups is wrong.
Following Bruno Frey and Reiner Eichenberger," I now argue
that cognitive errors endogenously reflect the actions of suppliers of
beliefs and the cognitive effort of individuals.
A. The Supply of Error
In the laboratory, there is an enormously rich tradition of show-
ing that individuals are extremely subject to social influence, and er-
6 See, for example, David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q J
Econ 443,445-46 (1997) (noting that hyperbolic discount functions place constraints on consum-
ers because current preferences may change, and thus consumers may make poor decisions);
H.M. Shefrin and Richard Thaler, An Economic Theory of Self-Control 2-3 (NBER Working
Paper No 208, July 1978), online at http://nber.org/papers/w0208 (visited Jan 3, 2006) (viewing
people as an organization rather than as individuals, and then applying standard agency theories
to explain self-control problems).
7 See, for example, Gilles Saint-Paul, Cognitive Ability and Paternalism (IZA Discussion
Paper No 609, 2002), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=343883 (vis-
ited Jan 3, 2006) (arguing that people often fail to act rationally when considering economic
choices).
8 Self-control problems offer a more limited scope for intervention for two reasons. First,
if paternalism is motivated by self-control, these paternalistic interventions always involve trad-
ing off the welfare of people at one point in time with people at some other point in time, and
this requires tricky social welfare decisions. Second, the first-best response to self-control prob-
lems is always to increase the availability of technologies or contracts that facilitate private self-
control, which cannot really be called paternalism because these policies increase, rather than
decrease, the choice set.
9 See generally Richard H. Thaler, The Winner's Curse: Paradoxes and Anomalies of Eco-
nomic Life (Princeton 1994) (examining a variety of situations in which people do not behave as
classical economics would expect, including circumstances where auction winners bid more than
a particular item is worth, and therefore suffer the "winner's curse").
10 Edward L. Glaeser, Psychology and the Market, 94 Am Econ Rev 408,408 (2004).
11 See generally Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger, Economic Incentives Transform
Psychological Anomalies, 23 J Econ Beh & Org 215 (1994) (discussing how people react to
known cognitive anomalies and how to make decisions to avoid those anomalies).
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rors easily result from external stimuli. Solomon Asch is a pioneer in
this area who has shown that individuals report that a shorter line is
longer when planted confederates declare that they think the shorter
line is longer.12 Asch's basic result has been reproduced hundreds of
times throughout the globe,'3 and with many different types of ques-
tions. Opinions can be manipulated by peers.
Opinions can also be manipulated in other ways. For example,
Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein, and Samuel Issacharoff show
that debiasing techniques can be used to eliminate self-serving biases
in negotiations." Gregory Pogarsky and Linda Babcock illustrate an-
choring effects in an experiment on judgment." Edward McCaffery,
Daniel Kahneman, and Matthew Spitzer illustrate the power of fram-
ing in an experiment meant to replicate jury decisions." More gener-
ally, there is widespread agreement in the experimental literature that
even modest changes in framing can create wildly different results.
Outside of the laboratory, there is also substantial evidence sug-
gesting that suppliers are able to manipulate beliefs. In the legal
sphere, competent attorneys are paid well to change the beliefs of ju-
ries. Firms spend large amounts of money on advertising and other
forms of belief manipulation. Although some of this manipulation can
be seen as correcting errors (that is, informing the consumer), not all
advertising is strictly informative. In the premodern era, false advertis-
ing was common (touting the miraculous advantages of patent medi-
cine for example), and presumably firms would not have spent on this
unless it was having an effect.
12 Solomon E. Asch, Social Psychology 451-73 (Prentice-Hall 1952) (finding that one-third
of answers were erroneous in the face of group pressures). There is some debate as to whether
this result reflects people changing their minds or just saying that they changed their minds.
Compelling recent evidence suggests that people really do change their minds as a result of this
social influence. See Gregory S. Berns, et al, Neurobiological Correlates of Social Conformity and
Independence During Mental Rotation, 58 Biological Psych 245, 245 (2005) (looking at MRI
scans of study participants to determine if conformity to group determinations was based on
changes in perception or decisions to conform).
13 See generally Rod Bond and Peter B. Smith, Culture and Conformity: A Meta-Analysis
of Studies Using Asch's (1952b, 1956) Line Judgment Task, 119 Psych Bull 111 (1996).
14 Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein, and Samuel Issacharoff, Creating Convergence:
Debiasing Biased Litigants, 22 L & Soc Inquiry 913, 922 (1997) (discussing how intervention can
mitigate self-serving biases and promote efficient dispute settlement in litigation).
15 Greg Pogarsky and Linda Babcock, Damage Caps, Motivated Anchoring, and Bargaining
Impasse, 30 J Legal Stud 143, 148-50 (2001) (noting that damage caps greatly exceeding the
values involved in a case create an anchoring effect).
16 Edward J. McCaffery, Daniel J. Kahneman, and Matthew L. Spitzer, Framing the Jury:
Cognitive Perspective on Pain and Suffering Awards, 81 Va L Rev 1341, 1359 (1995) (finding
serious differences among experimental jury awards based on different ways of framing the jury
instructions).
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Is there strong evidence that attempts at belief manipulation are
successful on a large scale outside of the laboratory? Unfortunately,
there have been few compelling natural experiments, although anec-
dotes with some evidence showing the power of indoctrination are
common. For example, Bruce Sacerdote and I examine the connection
between education and religiosity across countries." In the former
Warsaw Pact countries, where attacking religious beliefs was a stated
curricular aim, the levels of religious belief are extremely low and the
negative connection between education and religious beliefs is re-
markably high." Schools seem to have been able to convince students
that Christianity is false.
Matthew Gentzkow and Jesse Shapiro examine the role of the me-
dia in forming beliefs in the Middle East.9 There is a remarkable differ-
ence of opinion across the Islamic world in beliefs about facts sur-
rounding September 11, 2001. 20 According to a 2002 Gallup Poll, only 7
percent of Americans do not believe that Arab terrorists destroyed
the World Trade Center.2' Eighty-nine percent of Kuwaitis believe that
Arab terrorists did not destroy the World Trade Center.22 Gentzkow
and Shapiro show that, in the Middle East, exposure to CNN increases
the tendency to think that Arabs destroyed the World Trade Center
whereas exposure to Al-Jazeera decreases the tendency to think that
Arabs destroyed the buildings]' Education has a weakly positive im-
pact on the belief that Arabs destroyed the buildings, but this effect is
reversed if education is primarily Arabic. This evidence supports the
idea that individuals believe, at least in part, what they hear.
Alberto Alesina and I report that 60 percent of Americans be-
lieve that the poor are lazy, but only 26 percent of Europeans share
that view.24 By contrast, 60 percent of Europeans think that the poor
are trapped in poverty, but only 29 percent of Americans share that
17 Edward L. Glaeser and Bruce Sacerdote, Education and Religion (NBER Working
Paper No 8080, Jan 2001), online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8080 (visited Jan 3, 2006).
18 Id at 28-29 ("[T]he education-religion connection is not intrinsic but rather a function of
curriculum design and the objectives of those who control education.").
19 Matthew A. Gentzkow and Jesse M. Shapiro, Media, Education and Anti-Americanism in
the Muslim World, 18 J Econ Perspectives 117, 121-28 (2004) (examining how education, media
savvy, and specific media sources are related to opinions about America in Muslim countries).
20 Id at 117 ("[Seventy-eight] percent of respondents in seven Muslim countries said that
they do not believe that a group of Arabs carried out the September 11, 2001, attacks on the
World Trade Center.").
21 See Gallup Organization Questionnaire:America's Views on Muslim Countries, online at
http://brain.gallup.com/documents/questionnaire.aspx?STUDY=P0203008 (visited Jan 3,2006).
22 Gentzkow and Shapiro, 18 J Econ Perspectives at 120 (cited in note 19).
23 Id at 125 ("Most strikingly, those who watched only Al Jazeera are significantly less
likely to believe these reports than those who watched neither network.").
24 Alberto Alesina and Edward L. Glaeser, Fighting Poverty in the U.S. and Europe: A
World of Difference 183-84 (Oxford 2004).
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opinion.25 In reality, the American poor generally work harder than
their European counterparts and have a lower probability of exiting
from poverty.26 Although these differences in beliefs do not reflect
differences in reality, they do reflect the impact of one hundred years
of relatively leftist indoctrination in European schools and relatively
rightist indoctrination in American schools. Alesina and I provide
documentation of the substantive differences in what European chil-
dren and American children are taught about the nature of poverty.
If one major source of cognitive errors is the supply of beliefs,
then errors will not be random, but they will in part reflect the costs
and incentives faced by belief suppliers. Although the suppliers of be-
liefs may not be perfectly rational, they certainly increase advertising
when returns rise and decrease it when costs rise. There is abundant
evidence on the importance of returns in driving advertising expendi-
tures. For example, advertisers disproportionately spend to reach high-
spending segments of the market. The role of costs and benefits for
suppliers suggests that we should expect more errors when belief sup-
pliers face high returns from moving opinion and less error when the
costs of manipulating beliefs are high.
B. Self-Correction of Errors
As Frey and Eichenberger emphasize, a second source of endoge-
nous error is the effort that consumers can take to correct errors.
Human beings are not irrational automata, and with motivation they
should be able to reduce cognitive errors. Vernon Smith and James
Walker present a simple model where costly effort can reduce error,
and they summarize the experimental literature on incentives and
decisionmaking." They conclude, "Some studies report observations
that fail to support the predictions of rational models, but as reward
level is increased the data shift toward these predictions.'2 9
Amos Tversky and Ward Edwards, for example, show that paying
subjects five cents for right answers increases the accuracy of predic-
25 Idat 184.
26 Id at 60-68.
27 Frey and Eichenberger, 23 J Econ Beh & Org at 223-27 (cited in note 11) (discussing
four major factors that influence the reduction of anomalies: perception, the resulting increased
utility, the cost of changing behavior, and behavioral regularities).
28 Vernon L. Smith and James M. Walker, Monetary Rewards and Decision Cost in Experi-
mental Economics, 31 Econ Inquiry 245, 246-50, 251-59 (1993) (concluding that incentives de-
crease errors).
29 Id at 259.
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tions' In a variation of the Asch conformity experiment, Robert Baron,
Joseph Vandello, and Bethany Brunsman show that increasing the
stakes decreases conformism by 50 percent when the task is easy.3'
Confirming another prediction of the hypothesis that incentives im-
prove accuracy, Smith and Walker also show that the variance of out-
comes across people declines as stakes increase.2
While private decisionmakers are often faulty, errors are even
more frequent in political markets where the incentives to correct are
weak. In at least one opinion poll a majority of respondents in the
United States thought that Saddam Hussein was personally behind
the World Trade Center attacks." Even more striking, in a 1998 Pew
Poll, 63 percent of respondents thought that the United States spends
more on foreign aid than on Medicare (only 27 percent gave the right
answer). 4 My claim is not that all voting decisions are wildly errone-
ous, but rather that theory predicts that errors will be more likely in
voting than in private decisions, and that there is some evidence that
supports this prediction.
But there are many reasons to think that incentive effects will be
much stronger in the real world than in the laboratory. In experiments,
individuals have few tools with which to improve their reasoning, and
their only real method of responding to incentives is to think harder.
Outside of the lab, people have access to advisers, books, the Internet,
and more time. Their willingness to spend time and money to use these
resources will surely depend on the stakes involved in the decision.
30 Amos Tversky and Ward Edwards, Information versus Reward in Binary Choices, 71 J
Exp Psych 680, 683 (1966) (reporting the results of an experiment in which, over the course of
one thousand trials, individuals could win or lose a nickel based on their answers).
31 Robert S. Baron, Joseph A. Vandello, and Bethany Brunsman, The Forgotten Variable in
Conformity Research: Impact of Task Importance on Social Influence, 71 J Personality & Soc
Psych 915,921 (1996) (finding that "under conditions of extremely low difficulty, increasing task
importance by offering psychological and financial incentives for accuracy significantly lowered,
but did not completely eliminate, social influence"). They find the opposite result in cases where
the task is hard. Id (attributing this result to the tendency of participants to rely on social feed-
back "in an attempt to obtain cues regarding the most apparently accurate response"). One
potential explanation for this finding is that when the task is easy, a little mental energy can
create much more accurate decisionmaking. When the task is hard, it may be that imitating the
crowd is the best strategy available.
32 Smith and Walker, 31 Econ Inquiry at 258 (cited in note 28) (analyzing the results of
"oligopoly experiments" in which subjects were given bonus rewards in addition to their custom-
ary profit).
33 Gentzkow and Shapiro, 18 J Econ Perspectives at 117 (cited in note 19) (citing a Washing-
ton Post opinion poll in which 69 percent of Americans responded that they believed that Sad-
dam Hussein was either "somewhat" or "very" involved in the September 11 terrorist attacks).
34 Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, How Americans View Government.
Deconstructing Distrust (Mar 10, 1998), online at http://people-press.org/reports/
print.php3?ReportID=95 (visited Jan 3,2006).
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Just as the large expenditure on advertising is our best evidence
that beliefs can be supplied, the existence of substantial industries
specializing in advice and information suggests that in many contexts
people are really interested in knowing the truth. For example, 6.8
million people subscribe to Consumer Reports' major publications,"
one potential source of information that can undo supplier-created
biases in consumer spending. There is a large, thriving industry of
management consultants who provide information to firms and self-
help books. No one would claim that these resources eliminate all er-
rors, but they do provide tools with which a motivated consumer can
reduce error.
A particularly important way in which consumers are able to re-
duce error is through experience. John List investigates the endowment
effect in a trading card market and finds that "individual behavior
converges to the neoclassical prediction as market experience in-
creases."36 Monisha Pasupathi finds that conformity in Asch experi-
ments declines as people age and presumably become more experi-
enced." By acquiring experience, individuals can invest in improving
decisionmaking.'
There is also evidence suggesting that outside of the lab, consum-
ers increase their effort to make good decisions when incentives are
stronger. Alan Sorensen shows that customers search more for low
cost drugs when they are not insured and when they are shopping for
a drug that will be used regularly." Brigitte Madrian and Dennis Shea
find that better paid workers who have more to lose by making bad
savings decisions are less likely to simply rely on the firm's default
retirement plan.4° Patrick Bayer, B. Douglas Bernheim, and John Karl
Scholz report a similar finding where financial education has less of an
35 See 2005 Consumers Union Annual Report, online at http://www.consumerreports.org/
cro/aboutus/annualreport.htm (visited Jan 3, 2006).
36 John A. List, Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?, 118 Q J Econ 41,41
(2003) (answering the title's question in the affirmative).
37 Monisha Pasupathi, Age Differences in Response to Conformity Pressure for Emotional
and Nonemotional Material, 14 Psych & Aging 170, 173 (1999) (concluding that age decreases
conformity and does so more noticeably in situations where experience is helpful in improving
accuracy).
38 Jonathan Klick and Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irrationality: Moral
and Cognitive Hazards, 90 Minn L Rev (forthcoming 2006) (arguing that the importance of
experience provides another argument against paternalism, because paternalism will tend to
limit the acquisition of decisionmaking experience).
39 Alan T. Sorensen, An Empirical Model of Heterogeneous Consumer Search for Retail
Prescription Drugs (NBER Working Paper No 8548, Oct 2001), online at http://nber.org/papers/
w8548 (visited Jan 3,2006).
40 Brigitte C. Madrian and Dennis E Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Par-
ticipation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q J Econ 1149,1160-61 (2001).
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impact on higher earnings households because they are already be-
having in a more forward-looking manner.4
A key implication of the view that incentives reduce error is that
political beliefs should be particularly erroneous because voters lack
the incentives to learn the truth (after all one vote doesn't determine
anything). This effect is compounded by the fact that politicians have
strong incentives to persuade. Indeed, as suggested by the evidence on
beliefs about Arab terrorists and the World Trade Center, political
beliefs do seem particularly prone to error.
II. ANTIPATERNALISM AND THE ENDOGENEITY OF ERROR
Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler argue that "bounded rationality pushes
toward a sort of anti-antipaternalism-a skepticism about antipater-
nalism,"2 and that "issues of paternalism are to a significant degree
empirical questions, not questions to be answered on an a priori ba-
sis." 3 On one level this claim is unobjectionable. What public policy
debate is not ultimately empirical?
After all there have always existed plenty of grounds, like market
failures and externalities, for government intervention in the economy.
Bans on alcohol or drugs can be justified on the basis of externalities
alone; the attractiveness of these policies has always depended on em-
pirical evaluation of the magnitude of these externalities. Many exam-
ples of soft paternalism, such as the Surgeon General's warning on
cigarette packages, can be seen as information dissemination, and
there is always a public-good aspect to information. Almost all policies
have some justification even without any modern insights from psy-
chology, and as soon as any such justification exists, then the policy
debate is always an "empirical matter."
As such, I cannot dispute Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler's view that
paternalistic policies are an empirical matter. I do, however, dispute
the view that a richer model of psychology should increase our enthu-
siasm for government intervention. With boundedly rational voters
and politicians, democracy is no guarantee against political catastro-
phe. Moreover, as the three models in this Part emphasize, when cog-
nitive errors are in some sense endogenous, then economic theory
pushes us to think that private decisions will often be more accurate
than public decisions.
41 Patrick J. Bayer, B. Douglas Bernheim, and John Karl Scholz, The Effects of Financial
Education in the Workplace: Evidence from a Survey of Employers (NBER Working Paper No
5655, July 1996), online at http://nber.org/papers/w5655 (visited Jan 3,2006).
42 Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 50 Stan L Rev at 1541 (cited in note 2).
43 Idat 1545.
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In these models, I consider a paradigmatic example of paternal-
ism: replacing private decisionmaking with public decisionmaking. I
do not consider any form of mixed decisionmaking, and I ignore many
subtle ways in which the government can influence private decisions.
In all three cases, I assume that individuals make mistakes because of
erroneous beliefs, not unusual preferences. I assume standard prefer-
ences, because standard preferences provide us with a clear answer
about what an individual would like to maximize." The point of these
models is to ask whether private or public decisionmakers are more
likely to get things right when there are endogenous errors. To the
extent that the government makes bad decisions, this will compromise
all forms of paternalism, even those that are libertarian or asymmet-
ric."
The key decision in the model is a binary choice over an activity-
smoking perhaps-that yields benefits B and that carries long run per-
sonal costs, perhaps to health. To allow some scope for paternalism, the
true cost of this activity is C + e, which is greater than B. Individuals
only know this true cost with probability P. With probability 1 - P, the
individual believes that the cost is only C, where B > C. In all cases, I
assume that individuals maximize expected utility based on occasionally
erroneous beliefs. Expected social welfare based on the true costs,
which I will treat as the welfare criterion, is (1 - P)(B - C - e).
A paternalistic policy takes the form of allowing a governmental
decisionmaker to decide whether everyone undertakes the activity or
not. Because I assume that everyone faces the same costs and benefits,
there are none of the usual losses from imposing uniform choices on
heterogeneous individuals. These losses will generally increase the
advantages of private decisionmaking.
With probability if, the government agent knows the true cost of
the activity and with probability 1- )', the government believes that
the cost is C. Governmental decisionmaking increases welfare if and
only if ;" > P, and indeed without further information, it would be
impossible to know on theoretical grounds whether private or public
decisionmaking is better. But when the probability of error is endoge-
nous, theoretical predictions lose their neutrality and theory begins to
44 In the case of hyperbolic discounting, government actions that restrict behavior at some
future date might appeal to the individual at the initial time period, and might appeal to the
individual at the end of his life, but any such restrictions will at the very least disadvantage the
person at the point that his decisionmaking is being restricted.
45 See generally, for example, Colin Camerer, et al, Regulation for Conservatives: Behav-
ioral Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U Pa L Rev 1211 (2003) (advo-
cating for paternalism that delivers significant benefits to those who suffer from bounded ration-
ality, without imposing significant costs on those who do not so suffer).
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suggest that private decisionmaking will be less erroneous than public
decisionmaking.
Model # 1: Consumers face stronger incentives to correct errors that
directly impact their well-being than do government bureaucrats.
This first argument assumes that P and ir are the result of infor-
mation acquisition or other actions meant to reduce error. Both the
private individual and the governmental decisionmaker have access to a
technology that determines the probability with which the individual
knows the true cost of the action. The private individual can pay a cost
K(P) and the public decisionmaker can pay a cost Kor) to increase the
probability that they know the truth. The cost of information is increas-
ing and convex and the problem has an interior solution. I assume that
before investing in the information acquisition, both private and public
individuals believe that the true cost of the action is C + - with prob-
ability one-half and C - e with probability one-half The real cost con-
tinues to be C + e. Given these assumptions, the private decisionmaker
will invest to the point where K'(P) = .5(C + e - B).
In the case of a governmental decisionmaker, the problem is
symmetric except that the government decisionmaker does not care as
much about the individual's well-being as the individual himself does.
The government decisionmaker invests in knowledge to maximize 83
times individual welfare minus the costs of cognition, where 83 < 1.
Although government bureaucrats may be strongly altruistic, few ad-
vocates of paternalism would really argue that a government deci-
sionmaker would be willing to pay the same personal costs to make a
citizen's life better as that citizen himself would. With this assumption
the government will set K'(7r) = .5,8(C + e - B), and the government
will be less likely to learn the truth than the private decisionmaker.
One natural measure of the degree of limited cognition is the size
of e, which captures the degree to which people's beliefs about costs
differ from the truth about costs. As e increases, the accuracy of pri-
vate decisionmaking relative to public decisionmaking, or P - )r, will
increase as long as K'(r)> /3K'(P), which will always hold if
K"(.) isn't overwhelmingly positive or if the distance between P and
7r isn't too great. The private response to an increasing possibility of
extreme error will be greater than the public response to that error
because the private individual's welfare is more directly tied to the
magnitude of mistakes.
Obviously, this model is a simplification; there are many factors
that could reverse the results. The government might have access to
better learning technologies and there might be returns to scale in
learning. If governmental information acquisition was spread over
enough consumers, this would represent a real advantage, albeit one
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coming from the well-accepted public-good aspect of information, not
from paternalism per se. Still, the existence of better incentives at the
private level does suggest one advantage of private decisionmaking in
the face of endogenous error and that the magnitude of this advantage
may increase as the degree of error rises.
Model # 2: If error comes from the influence of firms or other in-
terested parties, and if it is cheaper to persuade a small number of
bureaucrats than a vast number of consumers, then government
decisionmaking will be particularly flawed.
Now, I assume that the size of errors is not a function of individ-
ual effort but rather of the effort of firms to spread error. I assume
that there is a firm that receives benefit J for each individual who un-
dertakes the activity and that there are N individuals in the market
whose decisions are either private or made by a bureaucrat. To model
the endogeneity of error, I assume that the firm can pay to increase
the amount of error, that is, 1 - P or 1 - ;r. The critical assumption is
that the cost of persuasion is also increasing in the number of people
who are to be persuaded.
The assumption that it is cheaper to sway a limited number of
governmental decisionmakers than it is to move the beliefs of millions
is supported by the much greater magnitude of spending on consumer
advertising relative to political spending. For example, the Federal
Election Commission reports that total funds raised during the 2004
election for both houses of Congress and the presidency came to
slightly under $2 billion.6 The Center for Responsive Politics reports
that total lobbyist spending in 2000 was $1.56 billion.7
As large as these numbers may be, they are dwarfed by consumer
advertisement spending. Indeed, Advertising Age reports thirty com-
panies alone spent more than $1.03 billion on consumer advertising in
2004, and ten companies had advertising budgets bigger than all
spending on the 2004 campaign." The health sector as a whole spent
46 FEC, Press Release, 2004 Presidential Campaign Financial Activity Summarized (Feb 3,
2005), online at http://www.fec.gov/press/press2005/20050203pressum/20050203pressum.html
(visited Jan 3,2003); FEC, Press Release, Congressional Campaigns Spend $912 Million Through
Late November (Jan 3, 2006), online at http://www.fec.gov/press/press2004/20050103canstat/
20050103canstat.html (visited Jan 3, 2006).
47 Center for Responsive Politics, Lobbyists Database, online at http://www.opensecrets.org/
lobbyists/index.asp (visited Jan 3,2006).
48 See Special Report: Profiles Supplement in 50th Annual 100 Leading National Advertis-
ers, Advertising Age (June 27, 2005 & Supp), online at http://www.adage.com/images/random/
lna2005.pdf (visited Jan 3,2006).
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$209 million on lobbying in 2000," but Pfizer spent $2.96 billion on
advertising last year and Johnson & Johnson spent $2.18 billion.0
These numbers reflect only spending, not the marginal cost of chang-
ing opinions, but the much greater spending on consumer advertising
supports the idea that it is more expensive to move millions of con-
sumers than a small number of politicians.
I model this assumption by assuming that the cost of persuading N
people equals g(N)h(1 - P) and that the cost of persuading one bureau-
crat equals g(l)h(1 -;r). Both functions g(.) and h(.) are increasing, and
the function h(.) is, again, convex. In the case of private decisionmaking,
the firm sets NJ = g(N)h'(1 - P) .As long as g(N)/ N > g'(N) (which
would be true if g(N) = gN ' with a < 1 for example), then the amount
of persuasion increases with the size of the market. In the case of public
decisionmaking, the firm sets NJ = g(1)h'(1 - ,'). Convexity ensures
that P > )r. The higher cost involved in persuading large numbers of
consumers implies that the amount of error will be lower.
As e rises, the gains from private decisionmaking increase be-
cause private decisionmakers are less likely to err, and this accuracy is
worth more if e increases. If g(N) = gN', then decreases in g repre-
sent greater bounds on consumer rationality, because as g falls, it is
easier to persuade people of falsehoods. The relative accuracy of pri-
vate decisionmaking will increase as g falls as long as
Nah"(1 - P) > h"(1 -)r), which will always hold if P and )r are close
or if hm(.) < 0. As g falls, the difference in error between the govern-
ment decisionmaker and the private decisionmaker will increase,
which suggests that the relative costs of governmental decisionmaking
increase as the limits to rationality increase.
One caveat to this argument is that in a divided system of gov-
ernment, imposing paternalistic policies requires the approval of a
number of different decisionmakers (the courts, the legislature, the
executive). Divided government will tend to increase the costs of in-
fluence and reduce the errors from government decisionmaking, and
the fans of divided government well understand this advantage.
Model # 3: Consumers have more incentives when making private
decisions than they do when voting.
I now compare private decisionmaking and information acquisi-
tion to voting in an election. Private decisionmaking is the same as in
Model # 1. Public decisionmaking is determined by an election, where
49 See Guillermo Foladori, Uneven Advance of Knowledge, Uneven Distribution of Benefits:
The World Public Health at a Crossroad 10, online at http://www.cspo.org/products/papers/
CrisisSalud.PDF (visited Jan 3,2006).
50 Id at 6.
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there are two candidates who do not engage in information acquisi-
tion, but rather just run for office. One candidate thinks that costs are
greater than B and the other thinks that costs are less than B. The
elected candidate will implement the policy (allow the activity or
don't) that corresponds with these beliefs.
There are many individuals, again initially believing that the true
cost of the activity is either C - e or C + e, each with probability
one-half. In a paternalistic society where the government will make
the decision, an individual will only improve his decisionmaking to the
extent that he believes that his vote will influence the election. I let q
denote any individual's belief that his vote will decide the election.
Although the model certainly allows for the possibility that people
overestimate the probability that their vote will decide the election, I
will assume that q is a small number that is closer to zero than to one.
The expected return from investing in information is zero if the
individual isn't the median voter, and the benefits are the same as they
would be if the individual is making his own private decision if that
person is the median voter. Therefore, the individual will invest in in-
formation up to the point where K'(P) = .5q(C + e - B). This first-
order condition can be compared with K'(P) = .5(C + e - B), which
is the first-order condition in the case of private decisionmaking. Even
if an individual thinks that he or she has a 5 percent chance of influ-
encing the election, which would represent a wild amount of error in
most elections, the incentive to invest in the electoral setting is one-
twentieth the incentive to invest in the private setting. As such, the
quality of decisionmaking should be much lower when people are
casting ballots than when they are buying commodities.
The degree of error depends on the correlation of information
signals across people. If information signals are perfectly correlated-
so that if everyone invests the same amount in knowledge, then either
everyone learns the truth or no one learns the truth-then private
decisionmaking is always worse than election-based decisionmaking.
If information signals are independent, then there is at least one po-
tential advantage from electoral decisionmaking: the tyranny of a
well-informed majority. If information is independent-P > 0.5-then
enforcing uniformity will have a positive effect, because the median
voter will vote for the right policy and this will ensure that everyone
follows this policy. Naturally, this discussion omits the costs of enforc-
ing uniformity on a population with heterogeneous preferences, which
would generate more costs from paternalism.
Of course, with independent information, when P is less than one-
half, enforcing uniformity will ensure that everyone does the wrong
thing. As q goes to zero, this will ensure the wrong decision for every-
one all of the time. Again, as the limits to rationality rise, the disadvan-
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tages of government decisionmaking increase. As above, reducing in-
centives for undoing biases is more costly when these biases are big-
ger. The one advantage of government decisionmaking-enforcing the
wise majority's views on the foolish minority-disappears as psycho-
logical errors grow and the majority itself is likely to be misinformed.
Further observations. The preceding three arguments gave three
settings where it is clear that errors should be greater when the state
makes decisions than when private individuals make decisions. This
tendency appears to increase when psychological problems increase.
There are other factors that support this view. Because elections are
complex events that combine a host of different issues, individuals
should be expected to have more problems eliminating psychological
errors. It should also be cheaper to influence an election than to
change the minds of consumers, because the complexities of an elec-
tion probably make it easier to confuse voters. Elections do not always
deliver candidates who are bad for voters, but there is certainly every
reason to believe that errors in a complicated electoral situation with-
out incentives will be worse than decisionmaking in a setting where
incentives are much stronger.
The previous arguments suggest that there are sound theoretical
reasons for believing that paternalistic governmental decisionmaking
will generally lead to bad outcomes. Is this implication wildly at odds
with the evidence? Have paternalistic innovations generally been
great successes? Paternalism does seem to have had successes. For
example, the 50 percent reduction in cigarette smoking per capita
since the Surgeon General's warning in 1965 can be seen as a success-
ful paternalistic intervention (especially of the softer kind).
But the fight against cigarettes must be put in the context of the
other significant paternalistic crusades both in the United States and
elsewhere. Paternalism has been used to justify government actions
and rhetoric towards alcohol, drugs, homosexuality, religion-related
activity, slavery, and even loyalty to the government itself. The nine-
teenth century crusade against alcohol brought Prohibition, which
appears to have had only a modest impact on alcohol abuse while
supporting a large, violent, underground alcohol-based economy." The
fight against other drugs is more defensible, but the advocates of mari-
juana legalization argue that the costs of this government policy far
exceed the benefits. Governments have attacked homosexuality for
centuries and often used paternalistic rhetoric for doing so.
51 See Jeffrey A. Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel, Alcohol Consumption During Prohibition, 81
Am Econ Rev 242, 242 (1991) (finding that alcohol consumption was not dramatically affected
by Prohibition).
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The track record of American proreligion paternalism is gener-
ally free of the religious genocide that has occurred elsewhere, but it is
still disturbingly full of odd restrictions on behavior, intolerance
among religious groups, and even violent outbursts. Slavery itself was
frequently defended by Southern apologists as a paternalistic institu-
tion needed to protect African Americans from the harsh realities of
the marketplace: "[S]outherners, from social theorists to divines to
politicians to ordinary slaveholders and yeomen, insisted fiercely that
emancipation would cast blacks into a marketplace in which they
could not compete and would condemn them to the fate of the Indi-
ans or worse."52
Most disturbing, governments are often persuaded that service to
themselves is indeed the highest of callings, and that as a result for
paternalistic reasons people should be induced to serve and be loyal
to the government. In the United States, this form of paternalism has
been pretty benign at least by world standards (pledges of allegiance,
jailing critics of World War I). Places with fewer checks and balances,
like Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia, turned to paternalistically justi-
fied prostate policies with awful results. Some paternalistic policies
have had positive benefits, but much of the time, paternalism has been
pretty harmful. Social welfare may be well-served by a general bias
against paternalistic interventions.
III. AGAINST SOFT PATERNALISM
In the previous Part, I questioned the view that psychology
should make us more confident about paternalistic governments. In
this Part, I specifically question the use of "soft paternalism," which I
will take to mean government policies that change behavior without
actually changing the choice sets of consumers. Typical examples of
soft or libertarian paternalism include "debiasing" campaigns, default
rules, and other interventions that change beliefs and attitude without
impacting formal prices faced by consumers. Although there are many
differences across these forms of intervention, I do not have the space
to treat them separately, and I will focus on the forms of soft paternal-
ism that change beliefs.
In this Part, I review seven arguments against soft paternalism. I
do not mean these arguments to suggest that soft paternalism is worse
than hard paternalism, although this is certainly possible. I also do not
mean these arguments to suggest that soft paternalism is always
wrong. I certainly accept the view that in many cases some form of pa-
52 Eugene D. Genovese, The Slaveholders' Dilemma: Freedom and Progress in Southern
Conservative Thought 1820-1860 61 (South Carolina 1992).
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ternalism will be inevitable. Because soft paternalism is both unstoppa-
ble and occasionally useful, the relevant policy question is whether soft
paternalism should be generally encouraged or generally discouraged,
not whether soft paternalism should be banned altogether. The point
of the following arguments is that there are many reasons to suspect
that soft paternalism can be quite harmful, and that academics should
not blindly rush to endorse soft paternalism as a tool.
Argument # 1: Soft paternalism is an emotiontil tax on behavior
that yields no government revenues.
Many examples of soft paternalism make people think that a particu-
lar behavior is particularly harmful. As Loewenstein and O'Donoghue
emphasize, creating an impression of danger is quite similar to a tax.3 It will
hopefully lower the amount of the activity, and decrease the enjoyment of
those who continue the activity. Government "education" programs
about cigarettes or safe sex have the result of convincing people that
smoking and unsafe sex are dangerous, which presumably lowers the
enjoyment of those who continue to smoke or engage in unsafe sex. The
Surgeon General's warning has acted to stigmatize smoking, and as
Loewenstein and O'Donoghue argue, similar campaigns against obesity
have the effect of turning eating into an exercise that produces shame
and guilt."
These forms of soft paternalism can be seen as nonrevenue in-
creasing taxes. They make behavior seem unattractive and reduce the
utility levels of those who continue to use the product. Although sin
taxes produce revenues for the government, among those whose be-
havior is unchanged, soft paternalism creates pure utility losses with
no offsetting transfer to the government. For this reason, Loewenstein
and O'Donoghue are surely correct that even if government chooses
its soft paternalism policies perfectly, they will still involve deadweight
losses that can easily be larger than the losses from standard hard pa-
ternalism.
53 Loewenstein and O'Donoghue, 73 U Chi L Rev at 199 (cited in note 5) (noting that
"[the same pain of paying that applies to purchase decisions can also apply when people pay
taxes" so the manner in which the government raises taxes can affect a person's state of mind).
54 These campaigns seem to have been effective, but their success was not the result of merely
informing people about the truth. There was little new scientific evidence in the Surgeon General's
warning, and opinion polls on cigarettes suggest that most people overestimate the risks from
smoking. W Kip Viscusi, Do Smokers Underestimate Risks?, 98 J Polit Econ 1253,1259 (1990) (ana-
lyzing a statistical sample of people's perceptions regarding cigarette smokers' risk of lung cancer,
and concluding that "the extent of overestimation [of the risk] is over 20 times as great as the
amount of underestimation, and the frequency of overestimation is over nine times as great").
55 Loewenstein and O'Donoghue, 73 U Chi L Rev at 202 (cited in note 5).
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Argument # 2: Soft paternalism can cause bad decisions just as
easily as hard paternalism.
If the first argument against soft paternalism is that soft paternal-
ism can impact behavior (and I have no doubt that it can), then this
has just as much possibility of creating social losses as traditional hard
paternalism. After all, government education programs will change be-
havior, just like taxes. These education programs seem to have just as
much possibility of being erroneously calibrated, and therefore caus-
ing inappropriate decisions, as sin taxes. Libertarian paternalism is
attractive to people who value freedom as an object in and of itself,
but it should not be particularly attractive to people who think that
the big problem with hard paternalism is government error. There are
many reasons to think that government decisionmaking involves con-
siderable error, and standard economic analysis tells us that these er-
rors will be just as costly to social welfare with soft paternalism as they
would be with hard paternalism.
Argument # 3: Public monitoring of soft paternalism is much more
difficult than public monitoring of hard paternalism.
Hard paternalism generally involves measurable instruments. The
public can observe the size of sin taxes and voters can tell that certain
activities have been outlawed. Rules can be set in advance about how
far governments can go in pursuing their policies of hard paternalism.
Effective soft paternalism must be situation specific and creative in
the language of its message. This fact makes soft paternalism intrinsi-
cally difficult to control and means that it is, at least on these grounds,
more subject to abuse than hard paternalism. It is hard to limit soft
paternalism because it is so difficult to determine whether a politician
or public statement violated linguistic boundaries.
One recent example of this phenomenon is the debate over gay
marriage and the "sanctity" of traditional marriage. According to re-
cent polls, 55 percent of Americans believe that homosexuality is
wrong and less than 50 percent believe that homosexuality is an ac-
ceptable alternative lifestyle. Given that emotions about homosexu-
ality appear to be stronger than emotions about 401(k) plans, homo-
sexuality is one of the most popular targets for soft paternalism. The
debate about same-sex marriage may be partially about policies with
real effects towards homosexual unions, but it is at least as much an
example of soft paternalism. Opponents of same-sex marriage want to
56 Pew Research Center, Press Release, Republicans Unified, Democrats Split on Gay
Marriage: Religious Beliefs Underpin Opposition to Homosexuality (Nov 18, 2003), online at
http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/197.pdf (visited Jan 3, 2006).
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deprive gays and lesbians of the word "marriage," which is seen as
giving societal sanction to homosexual unions. By contrast, the sup-
porters of gay marriage want to end the longstanding soft paternalism
that stigmatizes homosexuality.
Surrounding this debate over gay marriage is a steady barrage of
language against homosexuality that is itself a form of soft paternal-
ism. It is difficult to set rules that would control this language, and it is
even a matter of debate whether some political speeches are actually
hostile to gays. It would be much easier to discuss the appropriate size
of a tax on homosexual marriage than to determine the rules that
should restrict political language on traditional marriages.
Argument # 4:Although hard paternalism will be limited by public
opposition, soft paternalism is particularly attractive because it
builds public support.
A natural check on hard paternalism is the opposition of those
who regularly engage in a taxed or regulated behavior. Cigarette
smokers generally oppose politicians who favor tobacco regulations
and drinkers were eager to get rid of Prohibition. Any politician who
favors hard paternalism must weigh the perceived benefits of these
policies against the cost of alienating this potentially large group of
voters.
By contrast, soft paternalism-if effective-will build support for
the politician who opposes the targeted activity. Even soft paternalism
that creates too much fear against an activity will increase the popu-
larity of a leader if that leader is strongly identified with the fight
against this particular behavior. 7 As a result, we should expect more
abuse of soft paternalism than hard paternalism.
Argument # 5: Soft paternalism can build dislike or even hatred of
subgroups of the population.
The previous arguments focused on the reasons why soft pater-
nalism is likely to be abused. This argument focuses on an unfortunate
side effect of soft paternalism: building dislike and even hatred within
the population. Much of the most effective soft paternalism involves
broadcasting the message that a given behavior is bad or reflects self-
destructive weakness. Individuals who don't engage in this behavior
and who are exposed to these messages will come to think that people
who do engage in this behavior are unattractive human beings. This
57 Of course, if soft paternalism takes the form of demonizing those who engage in this
behavior, then this certainly has the possibility of creating a backlash. However, because political
leaders will have the ability to control the content of soft paternalism, they will be able to design
it in a way that will enhance their electoral chances.
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will create societal divisions and possibly lead people who engage in
this behavior to become increasingly uncomfortable in social situa-
tions.
There are many examples of this dynamic. Public campaigns
against smoking have led many people to think that smoking is a self-
destructive habit and that smokers are weak and probably insensitive to
those around them. Public campaigns about recycling and environmen-
talism have led many people to see the failure to recycle as a moral fail-
ing appropriately treated with moral opprobrium. The costs that smok-
ers and nonrecyclers face are real and potentially quite costly.
A particularly striking example of this occurs in the welfare con-
text. For decades, right wing politicians have tried to stigmatize wel-
fare recipients, particularly with stories about welfare cheats (like
Reagan's "welfare queen").58 These stories were certainly justifiable as
a form of soft paternalism, inducing people to want to work by stigma-
tizing government handouts. But is it obvious that making the more
fortunate members of society think that the destitute are morally defi-
cient is good policy?
Argument # 6: Soft paternalism leads to hard paternalism.
By its nature, soft paternalism builds support for hard paternal-
ism. Successful soft paternalism will tend to create social dislike for
the activity in question, and reduce the number of people who engage
in the activity. Both of these factors mean that hard paternalism be-
comes an increasingly attractive option to the electorate (or to courts).
In any reasonable political economy model, changing beliefs in a way
that convinces voters that a behavior is socially harmful will eventu-
ally lead to public support for more regulation.
The modern history of cigarette regulation shows this dynamic in
action. The first major government policy towards cigarettes was a
classic example of soft paternalism. The Surgeon General's Report in
1964 simply warned, "[C]igarette smoking is a health hazard of suffi-
cient importance in the United States to warrant appropriate remedial
action."5 At that point in time, remedial action meant soft paternalism,
58 See Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Weaving a Safety Net: Poor Women, Welfare, and Work in the
Chicken and Catfish Industries, 1 Margins 23, 25-26 (2001) (discussing the effect of welfare re-
form on poor women and mentioning President Reagan's denouncement of "welfare queens,"
which provided the American public with a "visual image of a promiscuous, lazy, cunning
cheat... [and] built upon earlier images of poor, black women as unnatural and pathological").
59 Tobacco Use- United States, 1900-1999, 282 J Am Med Assoc 23 (Dec 15,1999).
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and in both 1965 and 1969, Congress passed laws that required health
warnings on cigarette packages and in advertising.' o
The Surgeon General's warning was associated with a remarkable
turnaround in cigarette consumption, which had been rising steadily
over the twentieth century. In 1963, Americans on average smoked
2,768 cigarettes, or 7.6 cigarettes per day. In 2004, annual average ciga-
rette consumption had fallen to 1,320 or 3.6 cigarettes per day.6' Al-
though it would be foolish to attribute this entire decline to soft pa-
ternalism, it is also true that beliefs about the harmfulness of ciga-
rettes have changed over time62 and that across countries there is a
negative correlation between beliefs about smoking and smoking
prevalence."
During the initial period of declining cigarette consumption fol-
lowing the Surgeon General's warning there was little change in the
taxation of tobacco, and certainly the most natural interpretation of
the reversal of the trend in cigarette consumption is that soft paternal-
ism worked. However, the change in beliefs about smoking was also
accompanied by an increased desire to regulate and tax cigarettes."
Over time, in response to these popular beliefs, the courts and legisla-
tures have increasingly taxed, fined and regulated cigarette consump-
tion. This pattern is not unique to cigarettes. The road to prohibition of
alcohol also began with advocates of soft paternalism who tried to
change societal norms rather than banning alcohol by law.
60 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub L No 89-92, 79 Stat 282
(1965), codified at 15 USC §§ 1331-41 (2000); Public Heath Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub
L No 91-222,84 Stat 87, codified at 15 USC §§ 1331-41 (2000).
61 For data on estimated U.S. tobacco use, see Thomas C. Capehart, Tobacco Situation and Outlook
Yearbook 18 (Economic Research Service 2004), online at http://www.ersusda.gov/Publications/
so/view.asp?f=specialty/tbs-bb/&arc=C (visited Jan 3, 2006) (estimating that U.S. tobacco con-
sumption in 1963 totaled 523.9 billion cigarettes, and that consumption in 2004 totaled 390 billion
cigarettes). For population data, see Population: 1900 to 2002, U.S. Census Bureau, online at
http://www.census.gov/statab/hist/02HS0001.xls (visited Jan 3,2006) (estimating that the U.S. popu-
lation in 1963 was 189,242,000); Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2006 8, U.S. Census Bureau,
online at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/06statab/pop.pdf (visited Jan 3, 2006) (estimating
that the U.S. population in 2004 was 293,907,000).
62 See George Gallup, Smoking Level Declines as More Perceive Health Hazard, The
Gallup Poll 412 (Aug 31, 1981) (describing and presenting statistics that support a decrease in
the number of cigarette smokers on account of an increased perception that smoking is un-
healthy).
63 David Cutler and Edward Glaeser, What Explains Differences in Smoking, Drinking and
Other Health-Related Behaviors? (Harvard Discussion Paper No 2060, Feb 2005), online at
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/hier/2005papers/HIER 2 06O.pdf (visited Jan 3,2006).
64 Gallup, The Gallup Poll at 415 (cited in note 62).
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Argument # 7: Soft paternalism complements other government
persuasion.
Soft paternalism requires a government bureaucracy that is skilled
in manipulating beliefs. A persuasive government bureaucracy is inher-
ently dangerous because that apparatus can be used in contexts far
away from the initial paternalistic domain. Political leaders have a
number of goals, only some of which relate to improving individual
well-being. Investing in the tools of persuasion enables the govern-
ment to change perceptions of many things, not only the behavior in
question. There is great potential for abuse.
As a hypothetical example, consider Daniel Benjamin and David
Laibson's recommendation that soft paternalism be used to increase
savings." Assume that soft paternalism involved a public education
campaign to induce people to think more about the future and make
people aware that their own rosy scenarios will not necessarily occur.
As Benjamin and Laibson suggest, from the point of view of fighting
self-control problems, such a campaign might indeed have beneficial
results. 6
But this public education campaign also offers many degrees of
freedom that can be used in other, less benign ways. Perhaps the soft
paternalism campaign would warn of inflation, and might suggest that
other, less careful political leaders (that is, the opposition party) might
print money and devalue nominal dollars. Perhaps the soft paternal-
ism campaign might suggest that the stock market might fall, espe-
cially if non-business friendly leaders were elected. Perhaps the gov-
ernment might suggest that investing abroad is particularly perilous,
given the unreliability of other countries (especially, say, France). All
of these messages might be justifiable, but would also be pernicious.
Although this example may seem extreme, recent public relations
spending by the Department of Education for the No Child Left Be-
hind Act went, in part, to a columnist, Armstrong Williams, who regu-
larly promoted the devotion of both the President and the Secretary
of Education to improving the quality of education for America's
children. The commotion surrounding this expenditure should remind
us that the ability of incumbents to ensure victory through the powers
65 Daniel J. Benjamin and David I. Laibson, Good Policies for Bad Governments: Behav-
ioral Political Economy 14-16 (Boston Fed Reserve Conference Paper, May 2003), online at
http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/conf/conf48/papers/benjamin-laibson.pdf (visited Jan 3, 2005)
(recommending government regulation that would require large firms to offer 401(k)-type plans,
and would force employees either to make an "Active Decision" about whether to enroll in the
plan, or else to be enrolled by default).
66 Id at 14 (describing the "Save More Tomorrow" campaign, which enabled employees
who opted into plans to increase their saving rate from 3.5 percent to 11.6 percent).
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of office, which include the bully pulpit, is a constant risk in democ-
racy. Advocating soft paternalism is akin to advocating an increased
role of the incumbent government as an agent of persuasion. Given
how attractive it is to use persuasion for political advantage, an in-
creased investment in soft paternalism seems to carry great risks.
CONCLUSION
I will end by acknowledging that paternalism is here to stay and
suggesting a few rules motivated by psychology for guiding soft pater-
nalism and perhaps paternalism more generally. First, restricting pa-
ternalistic activities to areas where there is strong evidence of self-
harm, like particularly dangerous drugs or suicide, will minimize wel-
fare-reducing policies. Second, given the value of experience in check-
ing cognitive errors, sticking close to existing policies (conservatism)
seems likely to reduce errors. Voters should be better at evaluating a
new policy if it closely resembles policies that have been tried in the
past. The same argument suggests that small scale experimentation is
helpful, and federalism continues to have value in allowing for labora-
tories of democracy.
Another principle derived from psychology is that because be-
liefs, particularly political beliefs, are so prone to error, limits on direct
democracy may increase social welfare. Institutions like the Supreme
Court and the Senate, which effectively create cooling-off periods that
allow for debate that is not tied to a general election, may reduce er-
rors of policy. Separation of powers, which requires the suppliers of
influence to convince a number of different governmental actors, may
decrease the amount of public error. Simple debates, such as those
surrounding single issue referenda, may also reduce errors.
Given that errors are greatly exacerbated by the suppliers of bias,
situations with strongly interested parties who are likely to skew be-
liefs are particularly dangerous. Free entry in the battle of ideas is a
helpful check on this, but if one side has much more ability than the
others, free entry may not be enough. Rules that prevent interventions
(soft or hard) in areas where there are potential providers of bias that
have extremely strong incentives may reduce supplier-created bias.
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